GlobalSign has begun a new wave of revocations of SSL/TLS certificates for Russian websites. For operators, this means that checking whether a certificate is present on the server is no longer enough: what matters is whether browsers and other clients recognize it as valid.
Ru-Center, part of the Runity group, reported the new revocations. According to Georgy Kazarov, the company’s head of domain development and related services, dozens of certificates belonging to various organizations are currently involved. Some of them were included in the latest European Union sanctions list.
Those dozens describe the scale of the current wave, not the overall total from previous decisions. According to Ru-Center, foreign certification authorities have already revoked 11 thousand certificates in Russia, belonging to 1,3 thousand organizations. Of these, 4 830 are attributable to GlobalSign, and 3 456 to the Greek certification authority HARICA. These figures describe the cumulative scale and do not mean that all the certificates are being revoked at once.
What changes for a website
An SSL/TLS certificate is used to secure the connection between a website and its user. When a certification authority revokes it, the certificate should no longer be considered valid. As a result, a browser may display a warning that the connection is unsafe or fail to load the resource correctly.
Revocation itself does not mean that the web server has been shut down or the website deleted. It changes the status of the certificate that the connection check relies on. So the resource may remain accessible, but visitors will see a message about a security problem. Operators need to distinguish website availability from certificate validity: they’re related, but not the same thing.
The Ministry of Digital Development had previously warned that after foreign certificates are revoked, some Russian websites may not open correctly in foreign browsers, including Google Chrome, Safari, and Edge. Connections to certain services may be shown as unsafe. So the consequences depend on the specific resource and certificate, not just on whether the website has a Russian domain or server.
The presence of a certificate file on the server does not, by itself, confirm that external clients will continue to consider it valid. Web server settings may remain unchanged while trust in the certificate has already been broken. The server configuration isn’t necessarily to blame here—but the client does care about the certificate’s status.
That’s why revocation and technical unavailability should be considered separately. The first concerns trust in the certificate; the second, whether the user can reach the resource. A browser warning about danger doesn’t prove that the website itself has stopped working; likewise, a response from the server doesn’t prove that the connection will be accepted as secure.
Why revocations happen in waves
According to Ru-Center, foreign certification authorities first revoke certificates belonging to organizations included in EU and US sanctions lists. In early May 2026, updated CA/Browser Forum requirements for vetting organizations came into effect. The Forum brings together leading certification authorities and browser developers, including Google, Apple, Microsoft, and Mozilla, and sets shared rules for digital certificates.
The new requirements explicitly prohibit authorities from issuing certificates to companies on sanctions lists. Screening against the OFAC SDN List, the BIS Denied Persons List, and European equivalents has become mandatory. This is the regulatory context for the authorities’ decisions, but it doesn’t mean that every revocation has the same reason or affects the same group of organizations.
Ru-Center also cites the laws of the country where the certification authority is located, as well as complaints from third parties. According to the company, certificates that, in its assessment, do not fall under these grounds are sometimes revoked by mistake. In such cases, Ru-Center tries to reach an agreement with the authority to remove the certificate from the revocation list.
Kazarov explained that these appeals initially achieved little, but with each subsequent wave the company managed to reach an agreement on at least one certificate. These are individual cases, not a guarantee that any decision will be reconsidered. Negotiations may be part of the response to a revocation, but simply making an appeal doesn’t restore a certificate’s valid status.
The speed of revocation makes it harder to respond
There have been several waves of certificate revocations since the summer. Besides GlobalSign, HARICA has also revoked certificates that Russian organizations obtained after GlobalSign’s earlier decisions. A Ru-Center representative noted that HARICA carried out a revocation in a matter of seconds. Website owners had no time to respond appropriately before it was complete.
This example shows why replacing a certificate after a problem appears doesn’t always eliminate the period when clients are already seeing warnings. At the same time, the source does not claim that all revocations happen this quickly: this concerns one specific case involving HARICA. It would be unwise to assume every new wave will move at the same pace.
For anyone maintaining a website, the practical distinction is simple: getting a new certificate and keeping the old one valid are two different things. A replacement lets you use another certificate, but it doesn’t undo the decision to revoke the previous one. And when an authority acts quickly, counting on a long warning before the status changes isn’t always justified.
The Ministry of Digital Development said that website owners can obtain Russian DV and OV TLS certificates free of charge. Applications are submitted through the Gosuslugi portal, and the stated processing time is three working days. The ministry recommended this option for preserving secure access to Russian websites, including stores, banks, and marketplaces.
This procedure describes one available way to obtain a replacement, but it does not change the status of a certificate that has already been revoked. Nor do the details given confirm that such a replacement automatically resolves every compatibility issue for every user. What matters is the specific situation: whether the website’s certificate has been revoked and whether its owner can use an alternative.
Let’s Encrypt has separate terms. The authority explained that it will continue issuing certificates for Russia, but they will not be available to government agencies or companies under US sanctions. In June 2026, the service amended its user agreement, adding restrictions for individuals and organizations permanently residing or registered in territories subject to comprehensive US sanctions.
So the overall 11 thousand revoked certificates show the cumulative scale of decisions by foreign authorities, while the report of dozens refers to the current wave. These figures do not justify claiming that every Russian website has already lost, or will necessarily lose, its secure connection. For any specific resource, the key things remain its certificate status and the availability of a replacement.









